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Evacuation decisions in a chemical air pollution incident: cross
sectional survey
S Kinra, G Lewendon, R Nelder, N Herriott, R Mohan, M Hort, S Harrison, V Murray
Abstract
Objective To compare the health outcomes in sheltered and
evacuated populations after a chemical incident in a plastics
factory.
Design Cross sectional survey.
Setting Urban area in southwest England.
Participants 1750 residents from the area exposed to the
chemical smoke, of which 472 were evacuated and the
remaining 1278 were advised to shelter indoors.
Main outcome measure Number of adverse health symptoms.
A case was defined by the presence of four or more symptoms.
Main results 1096 residents (63%; 299 evacuated, 797
sheltered) provided data for analyses. The mean symptom score
and proportion of cases were higher in evacuated people than
in the sheltered population (evacuated: symptom score 1.9,
cases 19.7% (n = 59); sheltered: symptom score 1.0, cases 9.5%
(n = 76); P < 0.001 for both). The difference between the two
groups attenuated markedly at the end of two weeks from the
start of the incident. The two main modifiable risk factors for
the odds of becoming a case were evacuation (odds ratio 2.5,
95% confidence interval 1.7 to 3.8) and direct exposure to
smoke for more than two hours on the first day of the incident
(2.0, 1.7 to 2.3). The distance of residence from the factory or
level of exposure before intervention (first six hours) had little
effect on the odds of a person becoming a case.
Conclusions Sheltering may have been a better protective
action than evacuation in this chemical incident, which is
consistent with the prevailing expert view. Although this study
has limitations, it is based on a real event. Evacuations carry
their own risks and resource implications; increased awareness
may help to reduce unnecessary evacuations in the future.
Introduction
The accidental release of toxic chemicals into the community
may pose acute and long term health hazards (possibly including
cancers, congenital malformations, and psychosomatic illnesses)
and lead to tremendous public anxiety.1–3 In the event of such a
chemical incident, where the public may be exposed to a cloud of
toxic vapour, two options of protective action exist—sheltering or
evacuation. The prevailing expert view for public health protec-
tion in chemical air pollution incidents is to shelter rather than
evacuate the exposed population.4–7 However, this is based
largely on experimental and modelling data, and we found no
comparative data from actual incidents.
A fire started in a factory manufacturing plastic goods in
southwest England. The factory was situated on an industrial
estate adjoining a large urban residential area. The initial
response of the emergency services was to start evacuating resi-
dents from their homes to a nearby leisure centre. This decision
was subsequently reviewed by the members of the emergency
response team, and further evacuation was stopped, with
residents advised to shelter and stay inside their homes. The
resultant partial evacuation offered an opportunity to compare
the relative health protection offered by these two modes of
intervention. We therefore carried out a cross sectional postal
questionnaire survey on residents in the affected area and com-
pared the health outcomes among the people evacuated (one
third) and sheltered (two thirds).
Methods
We produced a health questionnaire that was administered to all
people living in the area that was exposed to the chemical smoke
(evacuated 472, sheltered 1278).
Questionnaire
We modified the questionnaire from model questionnaires pro-
duced by the Chemical Incident Response Service (Guy’s and St
Thomas’ Hospital, London) and National Focus for Chemical
Incidents (Department of Health, Cardiff). The questions related
to demographic factors; places of residence over the 48 hour
period after the incident; time spent outdoors; and likely
symptoms of ill health and existing health status, such as medical
conditions and smoking habits. We asked respondents to report
health symptoms if they had occurred at all and if they persisted
at the time of completion of the questionnaire (persistent symp-
toms). The questionnaire went out at the end of the first week of
the incident, and a reminder was delivered at six weeks through
an article in the local newspaper. A repeat questionnaire with a
reminder went to people who had not replied at two months.
Defining exposure and outcome
We identified the exposed population on the map by drawing a
semicircular arc from the incident site in the direction of the
greatest density of smoke, which we established by chemical
meteorological data. Where the arc intercepted small streets, we
either included or excluded the whole street, whichever the
greater proportion. The maximum distance from the factory that
was permissible for inclusion in the study was 1000 metres.
Since we did not have any direct measures of individual
exposure we used two proxy measures: distance of the place of
residence from the factory and an objective measure of relative
exposure at each of the places where the respondents stayed. We
used easting (distance east) and northing (distance north) grid
references for each postcode including the factory, to calculate
the distances in straight lines (in metres) by using a formula
based on the Pythagoras theorem. For the objective exposure,
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the Met Office undertook atmospheric dispersion modelling,
using the Numerical Atmospheric dispersion Modelling
Environment (NAME III).8 We used real time meteorological
data from the nearby meteorological station to run the model to
predict relative concentrations of pollutants over the 48 hour
duration of the incident. We swapped the relative concentrations
of pollutants at each of the postcodes on the geographical infor-
mation system ArcView, version 3.0 (ESRI, Redlands, California,
USA) for two time frames (the initial six hours and 48 hours); six
hours being the median time to evacuation.
For our analyses, we considered the exposure score for the
initial six hours as the primary exposure, since it represents the
actual exposure before the intervention, on which the decision
was based. We also calculated a cumulative exposure score over
48 hours by adding exposures over time spent by the participant
at each of the postcodes. Of the people who were evacuated,
roughly two thirds went to the designated evacuation site (leisure
centre), and the remaining third went to other convenient places,
such as homes of friends and family. We asked people who were
evacuated to provide the address and postcode of the place
where they stayed, if different from the leisure centre, and substi-
tuted these postcodes accordingly. If the evacuation postcode
was also in the exposed area then we used the exposure score for
that postcode; otherwise they were given a null value. The
cumulative, 48 hour exposure score is difficult to interpret as it
constitutes an inherent element of intervention, in addition to
the participants being generally indoors (and so not necessarily
exposed to that level of pollutants in the environment).
Acute symptoms produced by chemical smoke exposure are
generally similar to those caused by common viral respiratory
illnesses. Because of this lack of specificity of symptoms, we
decided to define cases on the basis of number of symptoms. We
established baseline prevalence of symptoms for the period
(winter) by simultaneously administering the questionnaire to a
random 10% sample (n = 1000) of residents from a neighbour-
ing town with a similar demographic and socioeconomic profile.
We calculated the mean symptom score (total number of symp-
toms per person) for the residents of the unexposed town and
regarded all those with a symptom score greater than 2 standard
deviations of the mean as cases.We defined persistent cases simi-
larly, but with symptoms persisting at the time of completing the
questionnaire (which was at least two weeks from the time of the
incident). The symptoms considered were runny eyes, swollen
eyelids, sore throat or nose, shortness of breath, cough, skin rash,
skin burns, nausea, vomiting, abdominal pain, diarrhoea, fever,
wheezing or asthma, palpitations, headache, lightheadedness,
and blurred vision.We gave each symptom an equal weighting of
one (present) or zero (absent).
Data from environmental sampling and healthcare services
Environmental samples, based on the expected emissions, were
taken repeatedly over a 48 hour period. Among the gaseous
emissions, samples we tested for included hydrogen chloride,
hydrogen cyanide, hydrogen fluoride, isocyanides, and styrene.
We used chemical tubes (Draeger, Aqua Air Industries,
Louisiana, US) to carry out these tests. The first air testing started
some 12 hours after onset of the fire, inside and immediately
outside the burning factory, in dense acrid smoke, and 100
metres downwind within the smoke plume. Other environmen-
tal investigations included tests for acidity of surface water;
asbestos fibre counts in air and on hard surfaces; and levels of
dioxins and furans in soil, grass, debris, and water samples. We
collected information about health effects from people seeking
medical help as a result of exposure. We collected information
from all relevant sources of medical advice including ambulance
and emergency departments as well as the local general
practitioners and telephone helplines.
Statistical analysis
We used multiple logistic regression to estimate the likelihood of
a person becoming a case for each of the independent risk fac-
tors. We used Stata, version 8 (StataCorp, College Station, Texas,
USA), for our analyses.
Results
We received 1096 (63%) completed questionnaires from the
exposed residents; four respondents sent back unfilled question-
naires to say that they were away at the time, and we excluded
these from further analyses. The respondents were older and the
proportion of female respondents was higher than among the
non-respondents (respondents: median age 49 years, 53%
female; non-respondents: median age 33 years, 46% female).
Of the people who received questionnaires in the adjacent
unexposed town, 334 (33%) replied. The mean symptom score
Exposed residents (n=1750)
Evacuated (n=472)
Respondents (n=299, 63%) Respondents (n=797, 63%)
Sheltered (n=1278)
(4 non-resident)
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was 0.48 (SD 1.41). On the basis of this, we regarded all those
with four or more symptoms as cases for the purposes of this
study (case definition: greater than 2 standard deviations of the
mean in unexposed area).
In the exposed area, the response rate (63%; respondents:
299 evacuated and 797 sheltered) and median response time (42
days; range: 1-66 days evacuated and 2-65 days sheltered) among
the evacuated and sheltered populations were identical (fig 1).
Figure 2 shows the location of the postcodes of residence of the
sheltered and evacuated respondents in relation to the density
and direction of smoke plume during the initial six hours. The
figure and the calculated median distance from the factory
(evacuated homes: 565 metres; sheltered homes: 572 metres;
range for both: 217-791 metres) show that the evacuated and
sheltered residents were similarly exposed to the smoke plume.
Table 1 shows the characteristics of the evacuated and sheltered
respondents. Multivariate analysis showed that evacuation and
direct exposure to smoke on the first day of the incident were the
two main modifiable risk factors for the odds of becoming a case,
while the actual distance of residence from the factory or the
exposure before the intervention (initial six hours) seemed to be
of little importance (table 2).
Of the people who had been evacuated, 195 went to the des-
ignated site (leisure centre) and 104 (35%) to other places, such
as homes of friends and family. Of those who evacuated to other
sites, 73 people provided accurate addresses, and for these we
used appropriate exposure scores (zero for 23 people who went
out of area); for the remaining 31 people we could not calculate
the 48 hour exposure. The mean 48 hour exposure score (based
on slightly fewer subjects, n = 1065) was similarly higher for the
sheltered residents (evacuated 0.01 (SD 0.03) g/m3 v sheltered
0.04 (0.11) g/m3; P < 0.001), and contributed little to the odds of
a person becoming a case (crude odds ratio 0.99, 95%
confidence interval 0.99 to 1.00); unchanged after adjustment for
all other variables in table 2; fig 3).
Environmental sampling
The first air testing carried out 12 hours after the start of the
incident, inside and immediately outside the burning factory, in
dense acrid smoke showed the maximum concentration of
5 parts per million of hydrochloric acid. Concentrations of other
gases tested were less than 1 part per million. Tests 100 metres
downwind within the smoke plume detected 1 part per million
of hydrochloric acid and other gases below detection levels. Fur-
ther tests carried out at various distances and timings over the
next two days found readings below detection levels. Tests for the
pH carried out on puddle water in the area showed neutral read-
ings. Counts for airborne asbestos fibres and other bulk and swab
samples did not show any evidence of asbestos. Samples tested
for dioxins and furans showed concentrations at or below those
expected under normal circumstances.
Table 1 Characteristics of residents exposed to the chemical smoke. Values
are numbers (proportions) of subjects unless otherwise indicated
Characteristic
Evacuated
(n=299)
Sheltered
(n=797) P value
Mean (SD) age in years 46.3 (24.3) 45.3 (24.3) 0.55
Female sex 162 (54) 423 (53) 0.73
Mean (SD) No of symptoms 1.9 (2.3) 1.0 (1.8) <0.001
Mean (SD) No of persistent symptoms 0.4 (1.2) 0.2 (0.9) 0.002
Cases (four or more symptoms) 59 (19.7) 76 (9.5) <0.001
Persistent cases (four or more
symptoms after two weeks of
incident) (%)
10 (3.3) 15 (1.9) 0.15
Median (range) distance of residence
from the factory in metres
565 (217-791) 572 (217-791) 0.51
Mean exposure score before the
intervention (initial six hours) in
g/m3 (SD)
0.01 (0.03) 0.04 (0.11) <0.001
Spent more than 2 hours outdoors on
first day (%)
59 (19.7) 127 (15.5) 0.096
Spent more than 2 hours in direct
smoke on first day (%)
12 (4) 21 (2.6) 0.33
Potential risk factors:
Asthma 29 (9.7) 61 (7.7) 0.27
Bronchitis 7 (2.3) 11 (1.4) 0.27
Heart disease 17 (5.7) 29 (3.4) 0.08
Eczema 5 (1.7) 20 (2.5) 0.44
Hay fever 24 (8) 40 (5) 0.059
Cigarette smoking 46 (15.4) 105 (13.2) 0.34
Table 2 Best model (R2=0.15) for odds of becoming a case
Risk factor
Odds ratios (95% CI)
Unadjusted Adjusted*
Age in years 0.98 (0.98 to 0.99) 0.98 (0.97 to 0.99)
Distance of residence from factory
(100 metres)
1.00 (0.99 to 1.00) 1.00 (0.99 to 1.00)
Exposure score before intervention
(initial six hours) in g/m3
0.68 (0.09 to 5.08) 2.03 (0.19 to 22.07)
Evacuated 2.33 (1.61 to 3.38) 2.54 (1.68 to 3.82)
Spent more than 2 hours in direct
smoke on first day
1.93 (1.65 to 2.26) 1.98 (1.67 to 2.34)
Asthma 3.34 (2.03 to 5.50) 3.21 (1.86 to 5.54)
Cigarette smoker 1.42 (0.88 to 2.29) 1.17 (0.69 to 1.99)
*Adjusted for other risk factors.
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Health effects identified from people seeking medical help
as a result of the exposure
Information available from medical inquiries included emer-
gency services personnel (n = 31) and local residents (n = 23).
The symptoms described were consistent with the mild
symptoms described above, such as sore throat, cough, runny
eyes, and skin irritation. Two people were admitted to hospital,
one for acute attack of bronchial asthma and the other for
suspected angina. Both had been evacuated and were admitted
at the time of evacuation.
Discussion
In two groups of residents similarly exposed to smoke plume
from a chemical incident, evacuation did not confer any
additional health benefit over sheltering. If anything, evacuated
residents seemed to have more ill health effects soon after the
incident than sheltered residents, although the difference did not
seem to persist beyond two weeks. Although our study has limi-
tations, it is a comparative study that is based on a real incident.
The results reinforce the prevailing expert view that favours
sheltering over evacuation as a response to protect populations
exposed to chemical air pollution incidents. Evacuations carry
their own risks and resource implications; increased awareness
may help to reduce unnecessary evacuations in the future.
Limitations of the study
The study has some limitations. An important concern is that the
level and nature of smoke exposure could have been different
between the evacuated and sheltered groups of residents. We
have tried to estimate the exposure in two different ways:
distance of the residence from the factory and atmospheric dis-
persion modelling of the pollutants by using the NAME III
model. This model was originally designed for dispersion mod-
elling of radioactive material, but it can also be used to model
dispersion of chemicals in the atmosphere.8 Dispersion
modelling of this type has some uncertainties—for example, we
had no information about thermal buoyancy of the plume or the
exact nature of the pollutants released. The NAME model, how-
ever, is widely used for dispersion modelling, and, given the
closeness of the meteorological station, the results would be
expected to be of reasonable accuracy.8 This type of work repre-
sents an improvement on standard methods of assessing
exposure, such as simply using distance as a proxy for
exposure.9–11
Self reported symptoms in the people who had been evacu-
ated could be the result of a combination of physical effects of
the smoke and the psychological impact of evacuation.12 13 We
did not include any instruments to assess the psychological
impact of the incident and so were unable to separate the two.
However, self reported symptoms could be considered
appropriate in this context where the perception of ill health is as
relevant as physical ill health itself, especially with regards to long
term psychological impact and anxiety. This study has looked at
early health outcomes only, which may differ from long term
health outcomes. Clustering of the responses and health effects
among members of the same household is a limitation of this
study, but we did not have the required data to incorporate in the
analyses. Results, in one previous study that accounted for
clustering, remained largely unaltered.10
Comparison with other studies
No other comparative studies are available to which we could
relate our findings. Previous studies looking at the health effects
of chemical incidents have entailed either sheltering or
evacuation.10 11 14–16 In one previous study of a fire in a plastics
factory, the residents were advised to shelter and did not report
any serious side effects.14 The theoretical basis for expert advice
favouring sheltering over evacuation is that protection offered by
barriers between the exposure and the population is at least as
effective as the protection offered by increasing the distance
between the exposure and the population—that is, evacuation.
Evacuations generally entail taking the population out of the
barrier zone and moving them through a much higher exposure,
albeit for a shorter duration. Our results show that direct
exposure to smoke is a more important determinant of ill health
than the cumulative exposure to smoke and these results are
consistent with those reported from other studies.6 11
Reasons for evacuation
Despite the expert guidance, an unacceptably high proportion of
chemical incidents worldwide result in evacuations. Possible rea-
sons for these include an instinctive response on the behalf of
emergency services to evacuate populations in danger, and the
preference to “play it safe” by first responders.6 Initial decisions
are often taken under very stressful conditions that do not allow
time for reflection. Lack of experience has also been proposed as
a possible reason since greater frequency of evacuations is
reported from areas where chemical incidents are uncommon.17
Another common factor is the delay in getting appropriate pub-
lic and environmental health advice.
Conclusion
Sheltering may have been a better protective action than evacu-
ation in this chemical incident. Although our study has several
limitations, it is based on a real event. These results are consistent
with the expert view that favours sheltering as the mode of action
in serious chemical air pollution incidents. Evacuations carry
their own risks and resource implications. Increased awareness
among emergency services may help to reduce unnecessary
evacuations in the future.
We thank the participants in this study for taking the time to complete the
questionnaires. We also appreciate the help provided by Geoff Chamings
and Shaun Carter at Devon County Council, who converted the postcode
references into distance between the factory and the residences.
What is already known on this topic
Populations exposed to chemical air pollution incidents are
often evacuated by the emergency services as a means to
safeguarding their health
Expert guidance favours sheltering indoors over evacuation
as the emergency response; however, this advice is based on
experimental and modelling data, and no comparative data
from actual incidents exist
The lack of a good evidence base may be undermining
adherence to expert guidance
What this study adds
Sheltering may have been a better protective action than
evacuation in this chemical incident, which is consistent
with the prevailing expert view
Evacuations carry their own risks and resource implications
Increased awareness may help to reduce unnecessary
evacuations in the future
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Commentary: Evacuation decisions in chemical incidents benefit from expert
health advice
Peter J Baxter
Kinra et al have evaluated symptoms arising from a fire at a plas-
tics factory that lasted 48 hours, in which partial evacuation of
the area took place in the first six hours, with most residents
remaining indoors for the rest of the emergency.1 Statutory
emergency planning and advice for people living around desig-
nated hazardous installations that manufacture or store
chemicals has been based on mathematical modelling of the
most likely scenarios for the catastrophic failure of storage
vessels or other failures in the plant, in which the duration of flow
of a cloud of chemicals that are accidentally released, neutral, or
denser than air will be less than 30 minutes (the average time for
countermeasures to be implemented).2 Peak exposure to an
individual living or working nearby at the time when such a
chemical cloud disperses should be higher outdoors than inside
a building with its doors and windows closed, at least for this
short period of time. The difference will depend on how well the
building has been sealed against the weather, to reduce normal
air infiltration rates. Once the danger has passed, the emergency
services would tell people to go outside into the fresh air.
Attempts at rapid escape or evacuation are considered to be
more dangerous than taking shelter indoors in such short term
emergencies, but the adverse health consequences that may fol-
low from this strategy—particularly the effects of exposure to low,
cumulative levels of irritant gases in people with asthma and
chronic lung disease who do take shelter—need to be studied
whenever these unusual incidents occur.
This “stay indoors” strategy may not necessarily apply to cer-
tain chemical incidents of longer duration. Smoke from plastics
fires usually contains a mixture of highly irritant substances,
together with combustion gases, which for polyvinyl chloride
(PVC) is mostly hydrogen chloride (HCl). Kinra et al measured 1
part per million of hydrogen chloride in the ambient air of the
residential area on their first testing at 12 hours, and thereafter
hydrogen chloride and other gases were undetectable. This very
soluble gas is unlikely to produce any reactions in people with
asthma at this concentration, and healthy individuals can be
exposed to higher levels for prolonged periods without ill
effects.3 Other irritants in the smoke will have an additive effect.
Acute incidents involving the inhalation of irritant gases (which
are among the most important materials stored at major hazard
installations and commonly emitted in fires) may, in severe cases,
cause toxic pneumonitis and even death, and brief exposure may
trigger reactive airways dysfunction syndrome (RADS; irritant
induced asthma).3 Kinra et al showed that the adverse respiratory
consequences in people with asthma and others were few and
concluded that remaining indoors was a safe option in the fire
they reported.1
Temporary evacuation may nevertheless be advisable where
a toxic release is threatened, such as in a crash involving a road
or rail tanker containing toxic gas. Plumes from burning chemi-
cal warehouses, tyre dumps, or plastic stores are usually buoyant
from the heat of the fire and may present little immediate risk,
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but whether they descend to ground level long enough to cause
a hazard to the people indoors, and the range at which people
could be affected, will depend on the management of the fire by
the fire services, the type of materials involved, the wind and
weather forecasts, and local topography.4 In warehouse fires,
chemical fallout from the plume may contaminate nearby
gardens and buildings.5 As these chemical fires can last for hours,
or even days, temporary evacuation when conditions permit
should always be considered, ideally with advice provided to the
emergency services by a public health response team.4 More epi-
demiological studies with good information on exposure will be
essential to build the evidence base for decision making in
chemical releases and for management after the incident.
1 Kinra S, Lewendon G, Nelder R, Herriott N, Mohan R, Hort M, Harrison S, Murray V.
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